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We examine the impact of ethnic fractionalization and conflict on limiting the educational 
development in Southeastern Turkey. Our estimates show that although the armed conflict in 
the region did not directly hinder education investments, it reduced school enrolment rates at 
middle and high school levels, while increasing enrolment at the primary school level. 
Moreover, we show that provinces with higher percentages of Kurdish population received 
less education investment. These results suggest that the neglect of Kurdish areas is an 
important factor behind Southeastern Turkey’s educational underdevelopment, while land 
inequality and the armed conflict had mixed effects on education in the region. 
 















Southeastern Turkey has historically been the most underdeveloped region in Turkey. 
Different studies on province level socioeconomic development (e.g., Ministry of 
Development, 2013) consistently reflect that the provinces in Southeastern Turkey dominate 
the lowest ranks in socioeconomic development.1 In this study, we will focus on 
Southeastern Turkey’s backwardness in education, since it’s often considered as an 
important determinant of long-term growth (Barro, 2001) and economic development 
(Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Galor, et al., 2009). Moreover, following the capabilities 
approach (Dreze and Sen, 2002) that conceives ‘beings’ and ‘to be’ as important dimensions 
of welfare, the availability of widespread education facilities is a crucial tool that provides 
the freedom of being educated. Lower access to education creates inequalities of 
opportunities that are transferred to the following generations in the developing countries 
(De Barros, et. al., 2009). 
In this article, we contribute to the education and economic development literature by 
empirically investigating the impact of ethnic fractionalization and conflict on the 
educational underdevelopment and lack of public investments in Southeastern Turkey. For 
this purpose, we implement an empirical analysis that includes data from 1970 and 1980- 
years before the insurgency between Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish state 
started. This approach gives us a wider perspective that evaluates the Turkish state’s policies 
in Southeastern Turkey, rather than exhibiting the insurgency as the only factor behind the 
underdevelopment of the region. 
The historical evidence starting from 1970 shows that the school enrolment rate in 
Southeastern provinces has been significantly lower than the provinces in the rest of Turkey 
(Figure 1). Southeastern Turkey also receives significantly less per capita public education 
investment (Figure 2), despite the contrary state discourse (Yeğen, 2007; Yayman, 2011) 
that underlines the need for allocating greater public investment in the region. 
However, the institutional structure in Turkey could not prevent the ethnic 
fractionalization and conflict in Southeastern Turkey, which historically has a Kurdish 
majority (Figure 3). The modern Republic of Turkey has rejected the Kurdish identity and 
                                                          
1 In our study, we consider the Southeastern provinces to be those that are listed as TRB and TRC 
according to the classification of Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat). These provinces are 
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt, Malatya, Elazığ, 
Bingöl, Tunceli, Van, Muş, Bitlis and Hakkari.  
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language (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997) and tried to assimilate all Muslim minorities under the 
umbrella of a Turkish identity (Yeğen, 2007). This policy created an environment for ethnic 
insurgencies (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997).  
Ethnic discrimination might be an impediment to economic development, since 
ethnic conflict arises when economic and social deprivations coincide with political ones 
(Stewart, 2005). Ethnic conflict may also influence educational development in a region. It 
can discourage school attendance, especially of girls, by making the environment outside 
households dangerous (Shemyakina, 2011; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008). Furthermore, 
the central government’s ability to bring public education to underserved areas is limited by 
armed conflict, as insurgents often target schools and teachers as places and agents of central 
government. In the early 1990s, the PKK killed 136 primary and high school teachers in 
Eastern and Southeastern Turkey (Kıbrıs, 2015). We empirically test the impact of both 
ethnic fractionalization and conflict at province-level with number of teachers per 100 
students and number of teacher per 100 school-age children as dependent variables. 
Furthermore, we also investigate the effect ethnic fractionalization and conflict on school 
enrolment.   
Moreover, similar to the United States (Galor et. al., 2009; Engerman and Sokoloff, 
2005), India (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005) and Latin American cases (Wegenast, 2009, 2010; 
Frankema, 2009) that are widely discussed in the economics literature, Southeastern Turkey 
historically has a larger land inequality (Figure 4). These studies shows that higher land 
inequality reduced school enrollment due to both widespread and more acute poverty and 
lower emphasis on investment in public education in rural areas. Therefore, in our empirical 
analysis, we also control for the impact of land inequality on educational development for 
the years in which data for land inequality are available.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows: The next section reviews the literature 
on the effects of ethnic discrimination and armed conflict on education; as well as land 
inequality in Turkey other countries. Section 3 lays out data, the methodology, and findings. 






2. The double squeeze in Southeastern Turkey  
This section discusses the possible channels that slowed down educational development in 
Southeastern Turkey. We first discuss why high land inequality is a candidate for explaining 
the educational underdevelopment in Southeastern Turkey. Next, we examine the Turkish 
state’s policies in Southeastern Turkey, and its approach towards recognition of Kurdish 
identity and the ethnic insurgency in the region. Then, we discuss the effects of insurgency 
on educational development in Southeastern Turkey.  
 
2.1. Southeastern Turkey as a case of high land inequality 
According to Keyder (1987), Turkish agriculture is historically characterized by the 
predominance of an independent, small-scale peasantry. However, the rural inequality in 
Southeastern Turkey has been larger than the rest of the country (Figure 4) as the agrarian 
structure in the region is historically different. Parts of Southeastern Turkey have been host 
to tribal leaders and large landowners called ağas (Aydın, 1986). However, unlike many of 
the countries with a history of colonization (e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005); land 
inequality in Southeastern Turkey is not an outcome of racial/ethnic inequalities. Indeed, 
most of the large landlords in the region are Kurdish locals (Besikci, 1970).  
An unequal distribution of land can influence rural inequality through two channels. 
First, it creates a larger share of very poor households who cannot afford direct and indirect 
costs of schooling. In regions with inegalitarian agrarian structures, lower income families 
might wish to have their children educated; however, they may be unable to invest in 
education. This is because high land inequality also reduces incomes of poor households and 
leaves them with insufficient sources for education (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and 
Tsiddon, 1996). Indeed, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) for India and Wegenast (2010) for Brazil 
and Kourtellos, et al., (2013) in a cross-country study show that higher land inequality 
reduces enrolment rates. High land inequality could also be an impediment on school 
enrolment in Turkey, as Kırdar (2009), Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör (2006) and Ferreira and 
Gignoux (2013) show that the level of wealth significantly influences enrolment of both 
girls and boys in Turkey. 
Second, high land inequality might lead to underinvestment in public education. 
Large landlords perceive little benefit in improving educational outcomes (Bowles, 1978). 
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This encourages large landlords to use their political influence to prevent public education 
investments (Galor et. al., 2009). Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) for Americas, Engerman 
and Sokoloff (2005) for the US, Wegenast (2010) for Brazil and Frankema (2009) for Latin 
America and Banerjee and Iyer (2005) for India conclude that the countries/states with high 
land inequality were laggards in terms of educational investments and reforms due to the 
negative influence of landowning elite. 
The wealthy landlords have an institutional influence in Southeastern Turkey 
(Beşikci, 1970), too. Turkish political parties attempt to earn the support of ağas who 
control a part of rural votes in elections (McDowall, 2003). Nevertheless, landlords’ political 
influence declined in recent years as the urban population share increased all over Turkey 
and rising Kurdish nationalism undermined local elites’ electoral influence (Tezcür, 2015). 
Moreover, the political mechanism outlined above is weaker in Turkey. Unlike most of the 
countries examined in the literature Turkey does not have a federal state structure. The 
educational reforms in Turkey are implemented uniformly in all provinces. The educational 
budgets in each province are determined and provided centrally by the Ministry of National 
Education.  
 
2.2. Kurdish population and the conflict 
2.2.1. A brief overview  
A large part of Southeastern and Eastern Turkey have been dominated by the Kurdish 
population, which is mainly spread through Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. According to the 
survey by Konda conducted in 2013, the Kurdish population constitutes 17.7 per cent of the 
population in Turkey. The construction of the nation state, under the Turkish identity, 
moved along with a denial of Kurdish identity (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997) and language 
(Yeğen, 2007). Kurdish was prohibited and actively prosecuted for most of the twentieth 
century in Turkey (Hassanpour et al., 1996). During military regime followed by 1980 coup 
in Turkey, PKK started an armed conflict in 1984. Between 1992 and 1999, the insurgency 
led to the killings of over 1000 people every year (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 
2013) with a peak of over 5000 causalities in 1994. The killings included not only Turkish 
soldiers and PKK guerrillas, but also civilians including civil servants such as teachers 
(Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Özdağ, 2009). In the early 1990s, guerrillas killed 136 teachers 
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and burned 238 schools in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey (Kıbrıs, 2015). The overall 
insecure environment and the PKK’s attacks on public employees created further 
disincentives for staying in the region (Kıbrıs, 2015; Kıbrıs and Metternich, 2016). Many 
young teachers and health employees appointed to conflict regions, either quit their jobs or 
tried to minimize the period they spent in the Southeastern region by any means (sick leave, 
and so forth). 
As a response to the rising insurgency, between 1987-2002, the Turkish state created 
an Emergency Governorship (OHAL), which ruled all OHAL officers, supervised the 
security forces and could relocate the citizens in the OHAL region (Aydın and Emrence, 
2015)2. Starting from 1985, the Turkish state also armed and paid Kurdish villagers, named 
‘village guards’, to combat the guerrillas in the OHAL region (Marcus, 2007). This extended 
the insurgency into the civilian population as the village guards and their families were also 
targeted by PKK attacks. In return, local militias aligned to the Turkish state visited violence 
on civilians in the OHAL region as well. In addition, the Turkish state emptied a significant 
part of the insurgency region through waves of forced migration. A report by a major 
political party, the CHP (1999) notes that 450,000 civilians in the region were subject to 
forced migration; 820 villages and 2,345 hamlets were vacated. The insurgency continued 
until the peace negotiations that started between the PKK and the Turkish state in 2012. 
With the unilateral ceasefire, the conflict’s intensity was significantly reduced for three 
years. The peace negotiations between the Turkish state and the PKK collapsed in July 2015 
and the armed conflict in the region restarted. 
 
2.2.2. Lack of public investment in the region  
A wide range of literature notes that ethnic fractionalization might lead to a bias in public 
goods in favor of groups that control the government (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Alesina and Le Ferrara, 2005; Stewart, 2005). For Turkey, possible public investment bias 
against Kurds is also a popular political claim; however, quantitative academic evidence is 
very limited. Kışanak, a leading member of HDP, the main Kurdish party, and the previous 
                                                          
2 OHAL region first covered 8 provinces including- Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, 
Siirt, Tunceli and Van in 1987. Later Adıyaman, Bitlis and Muş were also included in the OHAL 
region as ‘neighboring provinces’. In 1990, the newly created provinces of Şırnak and Batman also 




mayor of Diyarbakır, the largest city in Southeastern Turkey, claims ‘the greatest 
discrimination in this [Kurdish] land is economic discrimination’ (Hürriyet, 4 February 
2014). A predecessor party of HDP called DTP in their ‘2007 Political Standpoint 
Document’ claimed that the centralized nation state system of Turkey is the reason behind 
the socioeconomic gaps in Turkey (Yayman, 2011). 
Yeğen (2013) notes that the Turkish state perceived the Kurdish question mainly as a 
regional underdevelopment problem. In the 1960s new boarding schools in Turkey were 
mostly constructed in Southeastern Turkey (Besikci, 1970). Starting from the late 1980s, the 
Turkish state implemented ‘education by carrying’ policy widely in Southeastern Turkey 
(Keyder and Üstündağ, 2008). The lion’s share of Conditional Cash Payments (62.9 per cent 
in 2009) that includes educational subsidies on enrolment was given out in Southeastern and 
Eastern Turkey (Esenyel, 2009) as these are the regions where poverty is very widespread.   
However, the outcome-based statistics show attempts to reduce the regional 
socioeconomic gaps were insufficient. Figure 2 shows persistent regional inequalities in 
education between 1970 and 2012. The provinces with a Kurdish majority had significantly 
lower teacher per child ratios3. For reducing this gap, during the OHAL periods, Ministry of 
National Education paid teachers in Southeastern region bonuses for serving under 
deprivation conditions. In 1998, a new teacher would receive 13.6% more wages for 
working in Eastern and Southeastern regions (Hürriyet, 4 April 1998). However, the bonuses 
for serving in Southeastern Turkey did not continue in the post-OHAL period, although 
teachers’ unions consistently demand to bring the bonuses back (Cumhuriyet, 27 December 
2008; Milliyet, 30 March 2010; 13 October 2017).   
 
2.2.3. Omission of education in mother tongue/first language 
Turkey only very recently, in 2012, allowed Kurdish language teaching in private language 
courses and as a language elective in schools but still does not implement any Kurdish 
language instruction in compulsory education. Coşkun et al., (2011) and Çağlayan (2014) 
note that this policy leads to insufficient communication between Turkish teachers and 
                                                          
3 According to our calculations from Turkstat (2017), total personnel expenditures in public 
educational institutions respectively constituted 75.3% and 74.3% of total public education 
expenditures in primary, middle and high schools in total. 
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Kurdish students who could not speak Turkish. Therefore, they claim, the real learning of 
many Kurdish students does not start until they learn Turkish in school.  
According to Derince (2012) and Cin and Walker (2016), the language barriers are 
larger for girls. Due to unequal gender relations, girls are less exposed to the life outside 
household, which reduces their opportunities to learn Turkish. Indeed, Smits and Gündüz-
Hoşgör (2003)’s data reflects that 23.3 per cent of Kurdish women aged 15-49 cannot speak 
Turkish, whereas only 1.8 per cent of Kurdish men aged 15-49 cannot speak Turkish. 
Moreover, Kırdar (2009) shows a significant gap between the enrolment rates of Kurdish 
and Turkish girls even after controlling for many socio-economic variables; however, a 
similar significant gap does not exist between Kurdish and Turkish boys.  
Lastly, Watson (2007) reviews the interplay of language, education and ethnicity and 
finds out that the suppression of instruction in Kurdish in Middle East (including Turkey) as 
one of the primary example of education policies that contribute to armed conflict. 
 
2.2.4. The impact of insurgency on educational development  
The nature of a conflict’s impact differs from country to country, and it is hard to find 
stylized facts relating to civil conflict. Novelli and Lopes Cardozo (2008) list at least three 
avenues where armed conflict can influence educational chances. Firstly, armed conflict can 
lead to loss of relatives, direct physical violence etc. Secondly, armed conflict makes 
travelling to attend schools more dangerous. Thirdly, physical violence can destroy or 
overtake educational infrastructure. Moreover, Collier et al., (2003) point out that economic 
growth is likely to decline during armed conflict (or even cause outright recession), which 
would later also indirectly affect productive public spending. The negative impact on growth 
might also be permanent as conflict may result in deterioration of political institutions such 
as spread of corruption. The conflict also increases military spending, which might crowd 
out education and healthcare spending. 
Conflict might also discourage school enrolment by reducing returns on education. 
Several studies show that the civil conflicts reduced school enrolment rates (Chamarbagwala 
and Moran, 2011; Verwimp and Van Bavel, 2013). Conflict’s impact might also differ with 
respect to gender and place: worse for boys (in Iraq, Diwakar, 2015); worse for girls (in 
Tajikistan, Shemyakina, 2011); good for girls (in Nepal, Valente, 2013).  
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For Turkey, Berker (2012) finds children exposed to conflict are more likely to 
graduate from primary school and less likely to graduate from middle and high schools. He 
speculates that the unexpected positive effect on primary school completion may be due to 
the fact that many peasants in the smallest hamlets without schools are forced to move to 
larger settlements with schools. On the other hand, Kayaoğlu (2016) demonstrates that 
conflict reduced the teacher/student ratio in the OHAL region. Kıbrıs (2015) finds armed 
conflict damaged the quality of education and reduced university exam scores of high school 
graduates in the conflict region. She speculates that low exam scores are due to very high 
teacher turnover and absenteeism of teachers compounded by the conflict. Although the 
Turkish state aimed to reduce the ‘white collar flight’ by mandatory service in the conflict 
region and bonuses for working in there, these attempts were not sufficient as shown in 
Kıbrıs and Metternich (2016) in a separate study on medical personnel fleeing from the 
conflict zone.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we use province-level data to analyze the main factors that lead to the school 
enrolment and public investment gaps between Southeastern and other provinces in Turkey. 
In our analysis, we aim to test the impact of land distribution, ethnicity and conflict on 
school enrolment ratios, per student and per capita education staff in each province.  
 
3.1. Data and variable selection 
Table 1 summarizes the data used in this study. Inclusion of data from 1970 and 1980 is 
helpful for controlling for the share of the Kurdish population’s impact before the PKK 
insurgency. We measure the levels of educational attainment with primary, middle and high 
school net enrolment ratios for boys and girls. We measure land distribution inequality with 
Gini coefficient4. Province-level data for land Gini coefficient is only available for years 
1970, 1991 and 2000. Similarly, for the post-1960 period, the province-level share of 
Kurdish population ratio data is only available for years 1965, 1990 and 2000. Due to data 
                                                          
4 Gini coefficient is an inequality measure taking into account all points of distribution rather than only ratios 
of certain points of distribution and takes the values between 0 and 1. Higher values of Gini coefficient imply 
higher land inequality. 
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limitations, the regression analysis for school enrolment is restricted to three years (1970, 
1990, and 2000). There were 67 provinces in 1970, 73 in 1990 and 81 in 2000. Hence, we 
have 221 observations in the pooled data set. 
We measure the regional gaps in public investment on education by number of 
teachers per 100 students and number of teachers per 100 school-age children for primary, 
middle and high school levels. We controlled for the public investment variables with lags 
of independent variables because the institutional variables might evolve over the longer 
run. Since we have land Gini coefficient and Kurdish population ratio data only for 1970, 
1990, and 2000, we investigate the education investment variables for 1980, 2000 and 2012. 
There were 67 provinces in 1980, 81 in 2000 and 81 in 2012, hence we have 229 
observations in the pooled data set.   
The number of teachers per 100 students and number of teachers per 100 school-age 
children ratios, for 2000 and 2012 and net school enrolment rates for 2000 are obtained from 
Turkstat (2014b). We construct data for net school enrolment rates in 1970 and 1990 and 
teacher per 100 students, teacher per 100 children in 1980 by obtaining the student and 
teacher numbers from the MoNE Statistical Yearbooks (Turkstat, 1976a, 1976b, 1984b, 
1984c, 1994a, 2004) and number of school-age children from Population Censuses 
(Turkstat, 1977, 1993). The net enrolment rates are missing for 1980, since MoNE Statistical 
Yearbooks do not have age or year of birth data for 1980. The primary and middle schools 
were combined between 1997 and 2011. We reconstruct primary and middle school data by 
taking the first five grades as primary and grades between 6 and 8 as middle school. In 2012, 
the primary and middle schools in Turkey were separated again and accordingly Turkstat 
provides separate data for these types of schools. Numbers of teachers and students are 
provided separately by Turkstat for 2012, so we preferred 2012 to 2010.   
We control the land distribution with the land Gini coefficient using data from 
general agricultural censuses constructed for FAO’s World Census of Agriculture programs. 
For 1970, we obtained this data from Çınar and Silier [Köymen] (1979). For 1990, we used 
Turkstat’s (1994b) 1991 General Agricultural Census and for 2000 we used Turkstat’s 
(2014a) 2001 General Agricultural Census.  
We control the share of Kurdish population with the share of population whose first 
language is Kurdish. We used data on share of Kurdish (Kurmanci and Zaza dialects) 
speakers from Mutlu (1996) and Kıbrıs (2015). After 1965, Turkstat stopped including 
12 
 
questions regarding mother tongue in the population censuses. Using the population census 
of 1935 and 1965, Mutlu (1996) predicts that 64.2 per cent of Southeastern and 38.8 per cent 
of Eastern Turkey is Kurdish, and the Kurds constituted 10.0 per cent of the total population 
in 1965. Using the internal migration statistics, Mutlu (1996) and Kıbrıs (2015) respectively 
estimates that the share of the Kurdish population in Turkey has increased to 12.6 per cent in 
1990 and 15 per cent in 2000. In order to create share of Kurdish speakers for 1970, we 
linearly interpolate Mutlu’s 1965 and 1990 estimates. 
We measure the intensity of conflict by the number of civilian and soldier deaths per 
100,000 in each province within the past 10 years. We combine casualty data from three 
different sources: Özdağ (2009) provides casualties data for civilians, but only for incidents 
with 3 or more civilian casualties. Using Directorate General of Press and Information 
(2015)’s ‘Today’s Date’ archive, we combined Özdağ (2009)’s data with keyword search on 
newspaper articles. Summaries of news on Today’s Date provide us information for 
incidents with one or two civilian and military causalities. Finally, we complete the missing 
province information in Today’s Date archive by cross-checking the incidences with the 
Global Terrorism Database (START, 2015). Our combined data allows us to construct time 
and place varying series.  
We control for province level GDP capita, level of urbanization, population density 
and population growth for 5-14 year old children in our estimations. We obtained the level 
of urbanization, population density and population growth in 5-14 year old children data 
from respective population censuses (Turkstat; 1963, 1977, 1982, 1984a, 1993, 2014b). In 
order to construct GDP per capita figures, we also combine different studies. Turkstat 
(2014b) provided GDP per capita data at province level for the period 1987-2001, which 
covered years 1990 and 2000. Moreover, Özötün (1988) reports province level GDP per 
capita for 1975 and 1980. Using Özötün’s (1988) data for 1975, we deflated 1975 province 
level GDP per capita to 1970 based on annual growth rates in GDP per capita for Turkey 
between 1970 and 1975.  
Last, we control for the existence of strong levels of patriarchy with the missing girls 
dummy that we formed. UN (2015) data suggest that average boys-to-girls birth ratio is 
about 1.06 around the world. If the ratio of 0-4 year old boys-to-girls are two standard 
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deviations larger than mean (i.e. more than 1.082) we assigned 1 to the missing girls dummy 
variable and 0 if the ratio is less than 1.082.5 
 
3.2 Empirical methodology 
A number of studies use provincial level data to test the effectiveness of institutional 
structure in Turkey. These studies generally use panel data fixed effect regressions to control 
for unobserved variables in order to focus on the effectiveness of specific policies (Luca and 
Rodriguez-Pose, 2015; Cesur et al., 2017). The province-level panel data fixed effect 
regressions are more appropriate when variables exhibit change over time.  Unfortunately, 
two of the variables of interest, province level land inequality and ethnicity, data do not 
exhibit significant variations over time. On the contrary, they are two important ‘socio-
political cleavages’ that affect long-standing regional gaps in the institutional and 
socioeconomic structure (Güvenç and Kirmanoğlu, 2009). For this reason, we control yearly 
fixed effects and only broad regional fixed effects6 instead of province level fixed effects for 
examining the factors that affect enrolment rates for boys and girls, teacher per student and 
teacher per school-age children ratios. We expect that broad regional fixed effects would not 
absorb all of cross-province variation but they will absorb large differences across regions. 
Cin and Walker (2016) show that patriarchal attitudes (including its reflections in 
curriculum) are prevalent all over Turkey and even more prevalent in Eastern regions 
(including Northeastern Turkey which is not the focus of this paper). We cannot account for 
the differential effect of patriarchal attitudes on school enrolment because we do not have a 
good empirical proxy. Instead, we employ two additional empirical strategies along with the 
missing women dummy mentioned above: We include dummy variables on broader regions 
to account for cultural differences between regions including a dummy variable on Eastern. 
We also estimate school enrolment for boys and girls in separate regressions, which allow us 
to show the factors explaining the enrolment for boys and girls separately. 
                                                          
5 Unfortunately, the 0-4 years old sex ratio for 1970 is not credible, there are more girls than boys in 
most provinces. This anomaly is only limited to 0-4 years olds in 1970. As a result, we use 1975 0-4 
years old boys-to-girls ratio as a proxy for 1970.  
6 We divide Turkey into five broad regions: West (TR1, TR2, TR3, and TR4), South (TR6), Central 
(TR5 and TR7), North (TR8 and TR9), and East (TRA, TRB, TRC). As a robustness check, we 
recalculated OLS estimates without region dummies. Our coefficient estimates are very close to 
estimates including regional fixed effects (see Supplementary Material A).  
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In empirical analysis, we first, employ the standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions which fits a linear estimate by minimizing the squared errors with clustered 
standard errors at province level to estimate the net primary, middle and high school 
enrolment rates for boys and girls with the following equation: 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      (1) 
where the effect of land distribution inequality (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡), and the number of causalities per 
100000 within the past 10-years (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡) and the share of Kurdish population (𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
enrolment rate in each year (t) are controlled for each province (i). 𝛼𝑡 and 𝛾𝑗are respectively 
year and region dummies. Xitk is a vector of other control variables that are expected to affect 
the enrolment rates in provinces.  
Next, we estimate the factors behind the number of teachers per 100 students and 
number of teachers per 100 school-age children ratios using OLS regressions with yearly 
and regional fixed effects. Number of teachers per 100 students (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ/𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡) shows the 
number of teachers that the Turkish state appoints for the given public demand for 
education. We estimate this variable for primary, middle, high and all school levels with the 
following equation: 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ/𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         (2) 
We also test for the number of teachers per 100 school-age children (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ/𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
with a similar equation: 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ/𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      (3) 
On the one hand, the number of teachers per 100 student ratio reflects the supply of 
education investments, i.e. the number of teachers that hired for the existing demand for 
public education. On the other hand, there are regions where the schools themselves do not 
exist or are too far for the poor students to attend. The non-availability of schools can be 
more accurately captured with the number of teachers per 100 school-age children ratio.  
Moreover, similar to the existing studies on land inequality (e.g., Easterly, 2007; 
Galor, et al., 2009; Ramcharan, 2010), we use measures of weather and geography as 
instruments for land inequality. To conserve space, we only present OLS results in the main 
text. Two stage least squares with instrumented variables (IV-2SLS) estimates are available 
in Supplementary Material B. IV-2SLS is a two-step procedure where variable of interest 
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(land Gini coefficients) is predicted using other estimates (weather and geography) at the 
first stage and the predicted values of variable of interest replace the original values of 
variable of interest in the second stage. Although the magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients are different, the results are qualitatively similar.  
 
3.3. Empirical results 
In this section we present pooled OLS estimates for school enrolment, for number of 
teachers per 100 student and number of teachers per 100 school-age children ratios.  
 
3.3.1. School enrolment 
We present the OLS results for school enrolment in Table 2 along with the standardized 
coefficients7 for our main variables89. The coefficients on the share of Kurdish speakers are 
significantly negative for primary school enrolment. The standardized coefficients also show 
that one standard coefficient increase in the logarithm of share of Kurdish population would 
respectively reduce the primary school enrolment rate for girls and boys by 0.573 and 0.298 
standard deviations. Hence, we observe a larger negative effect of Kurdish speaker share on 
girls’ primary school net enrolment rate compared to boys’, which is consistent with the 
previous studies based on micro data (Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör, 2006; Kırdar, 2009). This 
outcome might be due to several reasons. There might be an unfavorable attitude of Kurdish 
parents’ toward their daughter’s education due to historical and cultural factors (Kırdar, 
2009). Moreover, Kurdish girls are less exposed to the world outside their households than 
Kurdish boys, which limits their proficiency in Turkish (Derince, 2012). Also Kurdish 
families might have extra incentives for insisting on their boys’ education, since learning 
advanced level Turkish would relieve an important barrier to Kurdish men for working in 
                                                          
7 The standardized coefficients show how many standard deviations would the dependent variable 
change if an independent variable changes by one standard deviation. We present the standardized 
coefficients for all variables in Supplementary Material C. 
8 We also report the regression results for gross enrolment rate in Supplementary Material D. Table 
D1 shows that main findings are qualitatively similar for gross enrolment rates.  
9 We only discuss full models in the main text because of space considerations (in total, we have 14 
different dependent variables). In Supplementary Material E we present regression results where we 
add the explanatory variables to OLS regressions one by one for selected dependent variables.  
16 
 
nonagricultural jobs and any bureaucratic tasks. This might apply less for Kurdish women, 
since the labor participation rates for women have been very low in Turkey. 
Signs of the conflict variable are significantly positive for primary school enrolment. 
These findings are unexpected but similar to Berker (2012)’s estimates. Rural settlements’ 
migration from smaller rural hamlets to larger villages with primary schools might have led 
to this outcome. The conflict variable is significant and negative for boys’ high school 
enrolment (at 5% level). Hence, rising insecurity in the region might also have discouraged 
families from sending their children to high school.  
The effect of the land Gini is negative and significant at 5% level except for girls’ 
high school enrolment. The coefficient of land Gini for girls’ high school enrollment is also 
negative and roughly the same size with boys’ high school enrollment, but it has higher 
standard errors. According to most specifications, growth in GDP per capita and 
urbanization in provinces statistically significantly increase school enrolment as expected. 
‘Missing girls’ (boys-to-girls ratio) dummies for patriarchal attitudes are mainly 
significantly negative. The school enrollment also increases with time, and the coefficient 
estimate for year 2000 dummy variable is significantly larger than the estimate for 1990 
especially for middle school enrollment. This probably reflects the impact of the compulsory 
education law of 1997, which extended mandatory education from 5 to 8 years. Finally, 
Eastern region dummy is negative and significant for girls’ high school enrolment, which is 
partially consistent with Cin and Walker (2016). However, for other levels, Eastern region 
dummy has insignificant and both positive and negative sign, which suggests other variables 
in the regression analysis already account for observed differences in enrolment rates. 
 
3.3.2. Teacher-to-Student and Teacher-to-Children ratios 
Table 3 and Table 4 respectively present the OLS results for number of teachers per 100 
students and number of teachers per 100 school-age children and the standardized 
coefficients for our main variables. Contrary to existing literature, the coefficient estimates 
for the land Gini variable are statistically insignificant and has mixed signs for both ratios. 
Unlike other countries (e.g., USA and Brazil) studied in the literature, education spending is 
financed by central government in Turkey. This probably reduces the landlords’ capabilities 
and incentives to block education expenditures. 
17 
 
The share of Kurdish population in provinces has a significantly negative impact on 
both ratios except at high school level for the number of teachers per 100 school-age 
children ratio, which still has negative coefficients. Moreover, for both ratios, the 
magnitudes of standardized coefficients for the share of Kurdish population are larger than 
the magnitudes of standardized coefficients for land Gini coefficient and fatalities in the past 
10 years. This shows that number of teachers per 100 students and higher teacher per 100 
school-age children ratios are more sensitive to differences in the share of Kurdish 
population. All the other variables have the expected signs: higher GDP per capita leads to 
higher number of teachers per 100 students and especially higher teacher per 100 school-age 
children ratios; more densely populated provinces and provinces with faster growth in 
school-age children have more crowded classrooms. 
We generally find insignificant effect of armed conflict on both ratios for middle and 
high schools. At primary level, our findings indicate that conflict increased the number of 
teachers per 100 school-age children ratio. This is an unexpected outcome considering that 
PKK’s attacks on teachers made teaching in the conflict region very undesirable for teachers 
and costly for the Turkish state. 
Table 5 presents a separate analysis that uses interaction terms- lags of Kurdish 
population shares multiplied by the year dummy variables for the years of conflict and post-
conflict- rather than the conflict variable. Table 5 also shows a negative impact of the 
Kurdish population, which supports the argument that Kurdish provinces were historically 
neglected regardless of the conflict. The interaction terms with insurgency years have 
statistically significantly negative signs for combined school levels, although the coefficients 
for number of causalities in Table 3 and Table 4 were insignificant. These findings suggest 
the effects of conflict might be indirect. The conflict might have discouraged white-collar 
workers from working in all Kurdish majority provinces regardless of the intensity of the 
conflict. This avoidance of serving in the region could either lead to teacher absenteeism or 
make the recruitment and retention of teachers in public schools in Kurdish regions costlier. 
The impact of conflict at different school levels is more complicated. The intensity of 
armed conflict significantly positively affected the number of teachers per 100 school-age 
children ratio (Table 4) in primary schools. Parallel to this, the interaction terms between the 
share of Kurdish population and 2000 and 2012 dummies are also statistically significantly 
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positive (Table 5). Hence, primary education had a different experience compared to 
secondary education in terms of the conflict’s impact.  
To summarize, we show that land inequality significantly reduces school enrolment 
(likely to be through poverty channel), which partially explains the school enrolment gap 
between Southeastern Turkey and the rest of the country. Moreover, we find a negative 
relationship between the share of Kurdish speakers in a province and primary school 
enrolment, which is larger effect for girls. Last, we find a significant positive effect of 
conflict intensity on primary school enrolment and a significant negative effect of conflict 
intensity boys’ high school enrolment. Our empirical findings support the claims of ethnic 
discrimination against Kurds. For 1980-2012, we find that a higher share of Kurdish 
speakers in a province is associated with fewer teachers per 100 students at every school 
level. Unexpectedly, we also find a significant positive impact of the armed conflict on the 
number of teachers per 100 school-age children at the primary school level, which is 
consistent with the Turkish discourse aiming to solve the Kurdish conflict through 
‘integrating Kurds’ by teaching Turkish (Yeğen, 2007; Yayman, 2011). The conflict 
increased primary school education investments in the region along with the security 
investments, which would also affect primary school enrolment (Berker, 2012). 
 
4. Discussion: Mechanisms behind the regional gaps  
In this section, we provide further analysis in order to determine the policy significance of 
independent variables. For this analysis, we multiplied the coefficient estimates from Tables 
2, 3 and 4 with Southeastern Turkey’s and the rest of Turkey’s means for respective 
independent variables to decompose the contribution of each independent variable. Then we 
take the difference of variables’ contribution to calculate the contribution of each variable to 
the difference between Southeastern Turkey and the rest of the country. In our analysis, we 
focus on the contributions of Kurdish population share, and the number of civilian and 
security fatalities in conflict and the land Gini coefficient. The “other” factors include both 
the contribution of control variables as well as the unobserved variables. Following Ziliak 
and McCloskey (2004)’s critiques on the dismissal of statistically insignificant variables, we 





Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively decompose the factors that led to the total difference in 
school enrolment between Southeastern Turkey and the rest of the country. Figure 6 shows 
that girls’ primary school enrolment rate was around 40 percentage points lower in 
Southeastern Turkey compared to the rest of Turkey in 1970. The gap declined over time as 
primary school education became more common. The Kurdish share emerges as the factor 
that has the largest effect on the regional gaps in girls’ primary school enrolment and 
accounts for 16.2-19.1 percentage points of the gap. The Kurdish share’s contribution on 
boys’ primary school enrolment is smaller as it accounts 5.1-6.1 percentage points of the 
gap. Nevertheless, the share of Kurdish population appears to have a large impact only on 
the regional gaps in primary school enrolment. Its contribution to the regional gaps is 
negative for girls’ middle or high school enrolment and less than three percentage point for 
boys’ enrolment at middle or high school (Figure 6).  
 We find consistent evidence for the negative relationship between land distribution 
inequality and school enrolment. Specifically, land inequality explains 2.7-5.3 percentage 
points of the regional gap in both girls’ and boys’ primary and middle school enrolment. The 
most likely mechanism in this relationship is the poverty channel. The land inequality’s 
effect is only 1.3-2.0 percentage points of the regional gap. This is probably because high 
school education was not widespread for most of the period between 1970 and 2000 
anywhere in Turkey. 
Last, the insurgency between the PKK and the Turkish state contributes to the 
regional gaps by roughly by 4.5 percentage points for girls’ middle school and roughly by 3 
percentage points for boys’ high school enrolment during the conflict era. We find that the 
conflict helped to partially close the regional gaps in both boys’ and girls’ primary school 
enrolment by 7.8-8.4 percentage points.  
 
4.2. Teacher-to-student and teacher-to-children ratios  
Figure 7 and Figure 8 reveal that the Kurdish population share contributes to the regional 
gaps between Southeastern Turkey and other provinces more than land inequality and the 
intensity of conflict variables. According to our estimates for all levels, 0.53-0.62 of the 
teacher gap per 100 students between Southeastern and other provinces is explained merely 
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by the share of Kurdish population share in Southeastern Turkey. Similarly, the share of 
Kurdish population reduced the number of teachers per 100 school-age children by 0.69-
0.81 in Southeastern Turkey. Our findings support the view that Kurdish majority provinces 
receive less public spending even after controlling for a host of confounding factors 
including intensity of armed conflict and land inequality. The effect of ethnicity in allocation 
of public spending holds for every decade studied in this article.  
One potential reason for this preference in allocation of public spending/investment 
is that electoral returns of public spending in Kurdish majority provinces are low for 
majority parties. Güvenç and Kirmanoğlu (2009) show that over a long period of time (from 
1950 to 2009; 16 general elections) Eastern and Southeastern regions are more likely to 
support “independents” or candidates from an ever-changing cast of smaller parties 
emphasizing Kurdish ethnic identity. In other words, there is a limit to how much a national 
party can garner support from Kurdish majority provinces only with public investment 
without any overtures to ethnic identity. 
The rising conflict can also partially explain the lack of educational investments in 
provinces with Kurdish majorities. Figures 7 and 8 reflect that the conflict had small direct 
effect on regional gaps in teacher-to-student and teacher-to-school age population ratios. 
Nevertheless, the exercise with interaction terms in Table 5 show that the influence of the 
share of Kurdish population on teacher per hundred student and teacher per 100 school age 
children ratios are exerted indirectly. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we have investigated the role of ethnicity, conflict intensity and agricultural 
land inequality on the lower rate of school enrolment at every level and less educational 
investment in Southeastern Turkey. Following the existing literature (e.g. Galor and Zeira, 
1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1996; Kourtellos, et al., 2013), at first glance, higher land 
inequality in Southeastern Turkey seems to be the primary candidate to explain the 
underinvestment. Indeed, our results hint that higher level of land inequality affected school 
enrolment rates by poverty channel. However, we do not find empirical evidence for the 
effect of land inequality on public investment in education. The governing elite centrally 
funded and administered public education for nation building purposes (Kirişçi and Winrow, 
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1997; Yeğen, 2007). Hence, unlike US South (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005) or Latin 
America (Wegenast, 2010) or India (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005), local elites do not need to 
shoulder the financing of public education locally. Nation building through public education 
is accompanied by the denial of Kurdish identity and language (Hassanpour et al., 1996), 
which eventually led to armed conflict and finally lack of instruction in mother tongue 
probably hampered the scope of learning for Kurdish students (Coşkun et al., 2011; 
Çağlayan, 2014; Derince, 2012; Cin and Walker, 2016). Indeed, we find that ethnic 
discrimination and armed conflict empirically better explain the lower public investment in 
education in Southeastern Turkey. Our empirical results show that an increase in the share of 
Kurdish population in a province significantly reduces primary school enrolment rates and 
the negative effect is larger for girls’ enrolment rate. Moreover, the results reflect that 
Turkish state invested disproportionately less in Kurdish majority provinces, despite the 
contrary rhetoric. 
Our results hint that the Turkey should put greater emphasis on reducing the 
socioeconomic gaps between Southeastern Turkey and the rest of Turkey. This requires 
greater public spending on education in Southeastern Turkey. Also, the resolution of on-
going ethnic tension and armed struggle in Southeastern Turkey would be an important step 
in reducing the regional socioeconomic gaps. However, the policies for ending the ethnic 
conflict in Southeastern Turkey are beyond the scope of this paper. These policies might 
include a greater recognition of Kurdish cultural identity by the Turkish State and also the 
possible steps that both the Turkish State and Kurdish Nationalist Movement can take to end 
the violence in the area. Last, we believe that the education in Kurdish mother tongue might 
reduce the impediments on education. 
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Supplementary Material A: OLS Results Without Regional Dummy Variables  
Table A1 here 
Table A2 here 




Supplementary Material B:  IV-2SLS Estimates 
The land inequality is commonly instrumented by the geographical and climatic 
characteristics (e.g. Easterly, 2007; Ramcharan, 2010). However, these characteristics can 
also affect other economic variables, which in return affect redistributive policies and bias IV-
2SLS estimates. Still in this appendix, we instrument the land inequality with geographical 
and climatic characteristics and report our IV-2SLS estimates for the robustness of our 
analysis. We expect higher and more volatile temperature to lead to higher land inequality, 
since these weather conditions might increase the vulnerability of the smaller farmers. 
Moreover, we expect a higher gap between lowest and highest altitude in a province to reduce 
the land inequality, since areas with greater variation in altitude might also be hilly which 
would geographically divide the land and not allow large plantations to exist. Among the 
possible altitude variables- average altitude, standard deviation of altitude and range of 
altitude; estimations with range of altitude performs best in the first stage of our analysis. 
Other measures of land concentration such as standard deviation of rainfall and crop 
suitability indices, which are commonly used in the literature (Easterly, 2007; Ramcharan, 
2010) did not perform well in IV diagnostic tests. We obtained average and standard deviation 
of temperature from TÜMAS database of Turkey State Meteorological Service (2015). We 
obtained crop suitability indices from and elevation range from Arbatlı and Gökmen (2015) 




We estimate net enrolment for primary, middle, high and all school levels with the 
following IV-2SLS equations: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑛 + 𝛼1𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡               (B1) 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                (B2) 
where 𝑌𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑛 shows the vector of instruments for land Gini coefficient. We present the 
estimates in Table B1.  
Table B1 here 
Next, we estimate teachers per 100 students for primary, middle, high and all school 
levels with the following IV-2SLS equations: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑛𝑌𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑛 + 𝛼1𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝑘𝑋𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) (B3) 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ/𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡       (B4) 
where 𝑌𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑛 shows the vector of instruments for land Gini coefficient. We exhibit our 
estimates in Table B2. 
Table B2 here 
Last, we test for the number of teachers per 100 school-age children (𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ/𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
with similar equations and present the results in Table B3. 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑛𝑌𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑛 + 𝛼1𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝑘𝑋𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)  (S5) 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ/𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡     (S6) 









Supplementary Material C: Standardized coefficients for OLS estimates 
Table C1 here 
Table C2 here 




Supplementary Material D: OLS Estimates for gross school enrolment 




Supplementary Material E: Additional OLS Estimates for girls’ net middle school 
enrolment and number of teachers per 100 school-age children 




Supplementary Material F: Correlations between variables 










Figure 1. Middle school enrolment rates (%) in provinces in Southeastern Turkey, in 
provinces with Kurdish population over 50 per cent and their difference with the other 
provinces (1970, 1990, 2001). 
 
Notes: A one-tailed z-test (at 1%) shows that middle school net enrolment rates are significantly smaller both for 
Kurdish and Southeastern provinces. Provinces that are located in Southeastern Turkey are those that are 
classified as TRB and TRC according to the NUTS classification of Turkstat. The provinces with Kurdish 




Figure 2. Number of teachers per 100 children (6-17) in provinces with Kurdish population 
over 50 per cent and their difference with the other provinces (1970, 1980, 1990, 2001, and 
2012).   
 
Notes: A one-tailed z-test (at 0.01%) shows that the number of teachers per 100 children are significantly smaller 





Figure 3. Percentage of Kurdish population according to the 1965 Census. 
 
Notes: The population shares are from Mutlu (1996). Between 1989 and 1999, 14 new provinces were created. 





















Figure 4. The average land inequality of provinces in Southeastern Turkey, provinces with 
Kurdish population over 50 per cent and their difference with the other provinces (1970, 
1991, and 2001). 
 
Notes: Land Gini coefficient measures the inequality between the sizes of the farms.  Gini coefficient takes a 
value between 0 and 1. The value 0 implies farms that are perfectly equal and 1 implies the case that all land is 
owned by one farm. Hence, higher land Gini coefficient reflects higher land inequality. A one-tailed z-test (at 





Figure 5. Girls’ Net Enrolment Rate: Predicted contribution of each factor on the 




Figure 6. Boys’ Net Enrolment Rate: Predicted contribution of each factor on the 







Figure 7. Number of teacher per 100 students gap: Predicted contribution of each factor 
on the differences between Southeastern and rest of Turkey (1980, 2000, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 8. Number of teachers per 100 school-age children Gap: Predicted contribution of 









Table 1. Average values for all variables in the study  
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2012 
Teacher per 100 students, all levels 2.89 4.30 4.15 4.49 5.66 
Teacher per 100 students, primary 2.76 4.14 3.83 4.07 5.67 
Teacher per 100 students, middle 3.72 3.37 4.11 4.07 5.74 
Teacher per 100 students, high 5.41 8.52 6.15 6.29 5.58 
Teacher per 100 children, all levels 1.70 2.52 2.80 4.42 5.66 
Teacher per 100 children, primary 2.76 4.03 3.69 3.69 6.40 
Teacher per 100 children, middle 0.90 1.05 1.83 3.61 5.99 
Teacher per 100 children, high 0.44 1.21 2.21 3.34 5.40 
Girls’ net enrolment, primary 0.66  0.83 0.88 0.98 
Girls’ net enrolment, middle 0.08  0.29 0.77 0.93 
Girls’ net enrolment, high 0.02  0.19 0.32 0.73 
Boys’ net enrolment, primary 0.86  0.89 0.92 0.98 
Boys’ net enrolment, middle 0.20  0.51 0.87 0.93 
Boys’ net enrolment, high 0.07  0.33 0.43 0.70 
Land Gini coefficient 0.54  0.51 0.49  
Kurdish speakers’ share 0.16  0.17 0.16  
Tot. fatalities per 100000a 0 0 4.86 12.19 2.58 
GDP per capita 593.47 762.30 1171.10 1416.16  
Urbanization rate 0.32 0.37 0.48 0.55 0.65 
Population density 54.37 67.64 82.90 103.14 117.49 
Boys-to-girls ratio (age 0-4) 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.05 
School age pop. gr %a 2.52 1.29 1.18 -0.89 -1.79 
a: Within the preceding decade. Arithmetic means of province data (not weighted). 
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Table 2. OLS Estimates for net school enrolment (1970, 1990, 2000) 
 Girls' net enrolment Boys' net enrolment 
 Primary Middle High Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. -0.311* -0.270* -0.115 -0.235* -0.253* -0.129* 
 (0.135) (0.122) (0.075) (0.096) (0.100) (0.063) 
Log of Kurdish % -0.094** 0.006 0.017 -0.030* -0.014 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) 
Log of total fatalities 0.059** -0.033 -0.020 0.063** 0.009 -0.022** 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
Boys-to-girls ratio dv -0.009 -0.054* -0.030* 0.005 -0.035* -0.028* 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.014) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012) 
Urban 0.102 0.170* 0.182** -0.109 0.140 0.157* 
 (0.071) (0.085) (0.056) (0.069) (0.083) (0.063) 
Log of gdp pc 0.105** 0.117** 0.100** 0.091** 0.121** 0.089** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) 
Log of pop. density 0.034* -0.009 -0.021 0.057** 0.004 -0.026* 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) 
1990 dv 0.067** 0.113** 0.077** -0.055* 0.193** 0.191** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) 
2000 dv 0.073* 0.581** 0.189** -0.057 0.521** 0.279** 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) 
South -0.004 0.000 -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 0.010 
 (0.029) (0.021) (0.017) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) 
Central 0.007 -0.012 -0.036 0.003 0.009 0.012 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) 
North -0.097** -0.019 -0.006 -0.055* -0.008 0.041** 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) 
East 0.032 -0.053 -0.069* 0.016 0.014 0.026 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) 
Constant 0.149 -0.484** -0.510** 0.245 -0.464** -0.353** 
  (0.165) (0.138) (0.102) (0.137) (0.120) (0.106) 
Standardized coefficients for the main variables 
Gini coef. for land distr. -0.147 -0.072 -0.063 -0.182 -0.074 -0.064 
Log of Kurdish % -0.573 0.019 0.121 -0.298 -0.051 -0.052 
Log of total fatalities 0.281 -0.089 -0.113 0.490 0.027 -0.109 
Number of Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 
R-squared 0.747 0.934 0.844 0.455 0.931 0.891 













Table 3. OLS Estimates for number of teachers per 100 students (1980, 2000, 2012) 
 Number of teachers per 100 student 
 All levels Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.385 0.327 0.870 2.669 
 (0.493) (0.524) (0.747) (1.773) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.306** -0.227* -0.536** -0.888** 
 (0.100) (0.108) (0.136) (0.236) 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.080 -0.091 0.034 0.103 
 (0.065) (0.050) (0.095) (0.155) 
Urban t-1 0.214 -0.132 0.159 1.463 
 (0.490) (0.439) (0.715) (1.266) 
Log of gdp pc t-1 0.557** 0.643** 0.184 0.375 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.139) (0.315) 
Log of pop. density t-1 -0.504** -0.425** -0.402** -0.829** 
 (0.106) (0.101) (0.147) (0.221) 
5-14 pop. gr. previous 10 years -0.252** -0.235** -0.232** -0.254** 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.074) 
2000 dv -0.433** -0.694** 0.292 -2.765** 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.153) (0.505) 
2012 dv 0.452** 0.626** 1.830** -3.619** 
 (0.168) (0.176) (0.219) (0.572) 
South 0.026 -0.003 0.265 -1.058* 
 (0.213) (0.223) (0.258) (0.495) 
Central -0.296* -0.192 -0.068 -1.324** 
 (0.139) (0.160) (0.195) (0.498) 
North -0.199 -0.165 -0.255 -1.206* 
 (0.142) (0.149) (0.181) (0.478) 
East -0.068 0.086 0.183 -0.866 
 (0.274) (0.300) (0.302) (0.658) 
Constant 3.549** 2.455** 4.574** 10.207** 
  (0.808) (0.790) (1.067) (2.078) 
Standardized coefficients for the main variables 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.030 0.024 0.052 0.097 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.302 -0.216 -0.411 -0.414 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.058 -0.064 0.020 0.036 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.773 0.752 0.741 0.538 






Table 4. OLS Estimates for teachers per 100 school-age children (1980, 2000, 2012) 
 Number of teachers per 100 children 
 All levels Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.247 -0.058 -0.213 -0.262 
 (0.440) (0.688) (0.651) (0.809) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.399** -0.360** -0.277** -0.145 
 (0.087) (0.104) (0.094) (0.111) 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.008 0.155** -0.208 -0.094 
 (0.061) (0.055) (0.108) (0.101) 
Urban t-1 0.444 -0.283 0.865 2.106** 
 (0.459) (0.484) (0.694) (0.658) 
Log of gdp pc t-1 0.554** 0.740** 0.567** 1.283** 
 (0.108) (0.137) (0.153) (0.175) 
Log of pop. density t-1 -0.423** -0.174 -0.386** -0.543** 
 (0.099) (0.105) (0.139) (0.120) 
5-14 pop. gr. previous 10 years -0.236** -0.311** -0.288** -0.263** 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.031) (0.041) 
2000 dv 1.201** -1.411** 1.744** 0.694* 
 (0.143) (0.156) (0.217) (0.274) 
2012 dv 2.187** 1.033** 3.695** 2.183** 
 (0.159) (0.203) (0.240) (0.315) 
South 0.116 0.076 0.093 -0.035 
 (0.175) (0.242) (0.176) (0.194) 
Central -0.077 -0.086 -0.228 -0.316 
 (0.132) (0.185) (0.166) (0.207) 
North -0.151 -0.431* -0.262 0.257 
 (0.121) (0.174) (0.164) (0.181) 
East 0.135 0.274 0.100 -0.164 
 (0.247) (0.265) (0.245) (0.314) 
Constant 1.486 1.156 -0.020 -4.588** 
  (0.750) (0.901) (0.990) (1.112) 
Standardized coefficients for the main variables 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.014 -0.003 -0.008 -0.011 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.285 -0.254 -0.137 -0.077 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.004 0.082 -0.077 -0.037 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.901 0.848 0.912 0.876 












Table 5. Period-based effect of Kurdish speakers’ share (OLS estimates; 1980, 2000, 2012) 
 All  levels Primary Middle High 
Teacher-to-student     
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.318 0.258 0.849 2.740 
 (0.506) (0.535) (0.753) (1.743) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.212* -0.166 -0.488** -1.000** 
 (0.099) (0.108) (0.150) (0.276) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 * 2000 -0.202** -0.143* 0.002 0.274 
 (0.060) (0.063) (0.100) (0.267) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 * 2012 -0.263** -0.241* -0.168 0.263 
 (0.098) (0.094) (0.162) (0.296) 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.782 0.758 0.744 0.540 
Teacher-to-children     
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.209 0.009 -0.308 -0.426 
 (0.445) (0.649) (0.663) (0.742) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.306** -0.467** -0.111 0.202 
 (0.086) (0.102) (0.085) (0.115) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 * 2000 -0.135* 0.366** -0.528** -0.568** 
 (0.052) (0.084) (0.061) (0.069) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 * 2012 -0.218** 0.174* -0.270* -0.845** 
 (0.070) (0.078) (0.124) (0.111) 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.904 0.856 0.920 0.905 
Notes: Province-level clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** denote 5 and 1 per cent confidence levels, 






















Table A1. OLS Estimates for Net enrollment without regional dummy variables (1970, 
1990, 2000) 
 Girls' net enrolment Boys' net enrolment 
 Primary Middle High Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. -0.296* -0.251* -0.109 -0.231* -0.265** -0.134 
 (0.133) (0.118) (0.072) (0.092) (0.093) (0.068) 
Log of Kurdish % -0.067** -0.008 -0.002 -0.015 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) 
Log of total fatalities 0.059** -0.033 -0.018 0.063** 0.008 -0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
Number of Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 
R-squared 0.717 0.933 0.838 0.430 0.930 0.886 
Notes. All other controls variables are included. Province-level clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** 
denote 5 and 1 per cent confidence levels, respectively. 
 
Table A2. OLS Estimates for number of teachers per 100 students without regional dummy 
variables (1980, 2000, 2012) 
 Number of teachers per 100 student 
 All levels Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.376 0.270 1.117 1.502 
 (0.487) (0.521) (0.760) (1.883) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.289** -0.165* -0.460** -0.838** 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.103) (0.147) 
Log of  fatalities prev. 10 years -0.056 -0.078 0.035 0.221 
 (0.066) (0.052) (0.097) (0.155) 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.765 0.748 0.734 0.504 
Notes. All other controls variables are included. Province-level clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** 
denote 5 and 1 per cent confidence levels, respectively. 
 
Table A3. OLS Estimates for number of teachers per 100 children without regional dummy 
variables (1980, 2000, 2012) 
 Number of teachers per 100 children 
 All levels Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.333 -0.033 -0.171 -0.349 
 (0.441) (0.649) (0.644) (0.735) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.339** -0.207** -0.203** -0.219** 
 (0.056) (0.078) (0.068) (0.082) 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.005 0.156** -0.193 -0.066 
 (0.063) (0.053) (0.109) (0.099) 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.899 0.838 0.909 0.872 
Notes. All other controls variables are included. Province-level clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** 






Table B1. IV-2SLS Estimates for net enrolment (1970, 1990, 2000) 
 Girls' net enrolment Boys' net enrolment 
 Primary Middle High Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. -0.178 -0.469 -0.359 -0.272 -0.617* -0.454 
 (0.369) (0.341) (0.234) (0.280) (0.268) (0.343) 
Log of Kurdish % -0.101** 0.016 0.029 -0.028 0.005 0.008 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) 
Log of total fatalities 0.059** -0.033* -0.020 0.063** 0.010 -0.021** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Boys-to-girls ratio dv -0.010 -0.052* -0.028 0.005 -0.032* -0.026* 
 (0.030) (0.021) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.013) 
Urban 0.092 0.184* 0.199** -0.106 0.165* 0.180** 
 (0.073) (0.085) (0.056) (0.068) (0.084) (0.066) 
Log of gdp pc 0.104** 0.119** 0.103** 0.091** 0.127** 0.094** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) 
Log of pop. density 0.033* -0.007 -0.019 0.057** 0.008 -0.023 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) 
1990 dv 0.076** 0.100** 0.061** -0.057* 0.170** 0.169** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029) 
2000 dv 0.085* 0.563** 0.166** -0.061 0.487** 0.249** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.031) (0.039) (0.034) (0.040) 
South -0.012 0.012 0.007 -0.005 0.011 0.029 
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) 
Central 0.004 -0.007 -0.031 0.004 0.017 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.018) 
North -0.098** -0.018 -0.005 -0.055** -0.006 0.042** 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.015) 
East 0.031 -0.051 -0.066** 0.016 0.017 0.028 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.032) (0.026) (0.025) 
Constant 0.112 -0.429* -0.442** 0.255 -0.362* -0.262 
  (0.218) (0.178) (0.120) (0.155) (0.143) (0.145) 
First stage for Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 
Average temperature 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.006** 
St. dev. temp.   0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021**  
Elevation range (1000m’s) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007  
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 22.874** 22.874** 22.874** 22.874** 22.874** 10.650** 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic 
9.994 9.994 9.994 9.994 9.994 9.584 
Hansen J Statistic 2.899 0.601 2.481 1.079 0.533 - 
Number of Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 
R-squared 0.745 0.933 0.835 0.455 0.925 0.878 
Notes: Province-level clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** denote 5 and 1 per cent confidence levels, 
respectively.  3 IVs: Stock-Yogo weak ID critical test values are 22.30 for a 10% maximal IV size, 12.83 for a 
15% maximal IV size, 9.54 for a 20% maximal IV size, and 7.80 for 25% maximal IV size. 1 IV: Stock-Yogo 
weak ID critical test values are 16.38 for a 10% maximal IV size, 8.96 for a 15% maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 









Table B2. IV-2SLS Estimates for number of teachers per 100 students (1980, 2000, 2012) 
 Number of teachers per 100 student 
 All  levels Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 2.143 2.163 4.675 1.375 
 (1.943) (1.992) (2.607) (5.111) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.375** -0.299* -0.685** -0.837** 
 (0.129) (0.136) (0.172) (0.301) 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.086 -0.097* 0.021 0.108 
 (0.067) (0.050) (0.109) (0.149) 
Urban t-1 0.087 -0.264 -0.116 1.557 
 (0.498) (0.434) (0.780) (1.179) 
Log of gdp pc t-1 0.545** 0.631** 0.159 0.383 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.138) (0.308) 
Log of pop. density t-1 -0.509** -0.430** -0.413** -0.826** 
 (0.104) (0.098) (0.148) (0.212) 
5-14 pop. gr. previous 10 years -0.268** -0.252** -0.268** -0.242** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.034) (0.081) 
2000 dv -0.365* -0.622** 0.441* -2.816** 
 (0.164) (0.160) (0.207) (0.506) 
2012 dv 0.547** 0.725** 2.035** -3.689** 
 (0.212) (0.214) (0.265) (0.599) 
South -0.078 -0.111 0.040 -0.981 
 (0.241) (0.252) (0.313) (0.585) 
Central -0.341* -0.240 -0.167 -1.291* 
 (0.153) (0.174) (0.197) (0.516) 
North -0.221 -0.188 -0.304 -1.189* 
 (0.142) (0.150) (0.185) (0.468) 
East -0.101 0.051 0.112 -0.842 
 (0.267) (0.294) (0.297) (0.660) 
Constant 2.930** 1.810* 3.236* 10.662** 
  (0.938) (0.914) (1.473) (2.519) 
First stage for Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 
Average temperature 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
St. dev. temp.   0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 
Elevation range (1000m’s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. 23.127** 23.127** 23.127** 23.127** 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 10.637 10.637 10.637 10.637 
Hansen J Statistic 1.347 1.349 1.047 1.155 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.764 0.743 0.716 0.537 
Notes: Province-level clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** denote 5 and 1 per cent confidence levels, 
respectively.3 IVs: Stock-Yogo weak ID critical test values are 22.30 for a 10% maximal IV size, 12.83 for a 











Table B3. IV-2SLS Estimates for number of teachers per 100 school-age children (1980, 
2000, 2012) 
 Number of teachers per 100 school age children 
 All  levels Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 1.703 1.985 -0.687 -1.821 
 (1.721) (2.061) (2.465) (2.380) 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.456** -0.440** -0.259 -0.084 
 (0.115) (0.132) (0.138) (0.146) 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.013 0.148** -0.206* -0.089 
 (0.062) (0.053) (0.104) (0.095) 
Urban t-1 0.339 -0.431 0.900 2.218** 
 (0.457) (0.472) (0.699) (0.618) 
Log of gdp pc t-1 0.544** 0.726** 0.570** 1.294** 
 (0.105) (0.132) (0.150) (0.173) 
Log of pop. density t-1 -0.427** -0.180 -0.385** -0.539** 
 (0.096) (0.104) (0.136) (0.117) 
5-14 pop. gr. previous 10 years -0.249** -0.330** -0.284** -0.249** 
 (0.027) (0.035) (0.033) (0.041) 
2000 dv 1.258** -1.331** 1.725** 0.633* 
 (0.164) (0.174) (0.244) (0.259) 
2012 dv 2.266** 1.143** 3.669** 2.099** 
 (0.192) (0.220) (0.287) (0.311) 
South 0.030 -0.045 0.121 0.058 
 (0.197) (0.278) (0.217) (0.235) 
Central -0.115 -0.139 -0.216 -0.276 
 (0.138) (0.195) (0.169) (0.201) 
North -0.170 -0.457** -0.256 0.277 
 (0.118) (0.172) (0.156) (0.175) 
East 0.107 0.236 0.109 -0.134 
 (0.238) (0.266) (0.233) (0.294) 
Constant 0.973 0.438 0.146 -4.040** 
  (0.890) (1.102) (1.153) (1.265) 
First stage for Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 
Average temperature 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
St. dev. temp.   0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 
Elevation range (1000m’s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 23.127** 23.127** 23.127** 23.127** 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 10.637 10.637 10.637 10.637 
Hansen J Statistic 1.750 2.866 2.480 1.946 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.898 0.842 0.912 0.874 
Notes: Province-level clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** denote 5 and 1 per cent confidence levels, 
respectively. 3 IVs: Stock-Yogo weak ID critical test values are 22.30 for a 10% maximal IV size, 12.83 for a 










Table C1. Standardized coefficients for OLS Estimates for net school enrolment (1970, 
1990, 2000) 
 Girls gross enrollment Boys gross enrollment 
  Primary Middle High Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. -0.147 -0.072 -0.063 -0.182 -0.074 -0.064 
Log of Kurdish % -0.573 0.019 0.121 -0.298 -0.051 -0.052 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 
years 0.281 -0.089 -0.113 0.490 0.027 -0.109 
Boys-to-girls ratio dummy -0.016 -0.052 -0.059 0.015 -0.037 -0.051 
Urban 0.087 0.081 0.180 -0.152 0.074 0.141 
Log of gdp pc 0.359 0.222 0.392 0.505 0.257 0.317 
Log of pop. density 0.128 -0.019 -0.090 0.349 0.010 -0.102 
1990 dv 0.172 0.162 0.227 -0.229 0.308 0.511 
2000 dv 0.192 0.855 0.573 -0.247 0.848 0.767 
south -0.007 0.000 -0.014 -0.018 -0.011 0.017 
central 0.013 -0.012 -0.078 0.011 0.011 0.024 
north -0.211 -0.024 -0.014 -0.197 -0.010 0.093 
east 0.079 -0.073 -0.195 0.063 0.022 0.066 
R-squared 0.747 0.934 0.844 0.455 0.931 0.891 
Number of Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 
 
Table C2. Standardized coefficients for OLS Estimates for number of teachers per 100 
students (1980, 2000, 2012) 
 Number of teachers per 100 student 
  All  levels Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.030 0.024 0.052 0.097 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.302 -0.216 -0.411 -0.414 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.058 -0.064 0.020 0.036 
Urban t-1 0.031 -0.018 0.018 0.099 
Log of gdp pc t-1 0.309 0.344 0.079 0.098 
Log of pop. density t-1 -0.322 -0.261 -0.199 -0.250 
5-14 pop. gr. previous 10 
years -0.485 -0.436 -0.347 -0.231 
2000 dv -0.185 -0.285 0.096 -0.556 
2012 dv 0.192 0.256 0.605 -0.728 
South 0.007 -0.001 0.055 -0.134 
Central -0.089 -0.056 -0.016 -0.188 
North -0.071 -0.057 -0.071 -0.203 
East -0.027 0.033 0.057 -0.165 
R-squared 0.773 0.752 0.741 0.538 








Table C3. Standardized coefficients for OLS Estimates for teachers per 100 school-age 
children (1980, 2000, 2012) 
 Number of teachers per 100 children 
  All levels Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1 0.014 -0.003 -0.008 -0.011 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.285 -0.254 -0.137 -0.077 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years -0.004 0.082 -0.077 -0.037 
Urban t-1 0.046 -0.029 0.062 0.162 
Log of gdp pc t-1 0.223 0.294 0.158 0.385 
Log of pop. density t-1 -0.196 -0.080 -0.124 -0.187 
5-14 pop. gr. previous 10 years -0.329 -0.429 -0.279 -0.274 
2000 dv 0.371 -0.430 0.373 0.160 
2012 dv 0.675 0.315 0.790 0.502 
South 0.022 0.015 0.012 -0.005 
Central -0.017 -0.019 -0.034 -0.051 
North -0.039 -0.110 -0.047 0.049 
East 0.039 0.079 0.020 -0.036 
R-squared 0.901 0.848 0.912 0.876 




















Table D1. OLS Estimates for gross school enrolment (1970, 1990, 2000) 
 Girls' net enrolment Boys' net enrolment 
 Primary Middle High Primary Middle High 
Gini coef. for land distr. -0.364* -0.320* -0.152 -0.261* -0.317** -0.174* 
 (0.162) (0.149) (0.102) (0.104) (0.126) (0.079) 
Log of Kurdish % -0.118** 0.008 0.018 -0.029 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) 
Log of total fatalities 0.082** -0.043* -0.022 0.079** 0.003 -0.018 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) 
Boys-to-girls ratio dv 0.009 -0.068* -0.035 0.003 -0.039 -0.019 
 (0.043) (0.030) (0.019) (0.033) (0.022) (0.020) 
Urban 0.058 0.217* 0.225** -0.209** 0.178 0.208* 
 (0.080) (0.098) (0.076) (0.076) (0.098) (0.090) 
Log of gdp pc 0.099** 0.147** 0.134** 0.074** 0.155** 0.116** 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
Log of pop. density 0.043* -0.023 -0.023 0.070** -0.008 -0.032* 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
1990 dv -0.034 0.069** 0.107** -0.195** 0.063** 0.253** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.020) 
2000 dv -0.086* 0.527** 0.238** -0.255** 0.398** 0.384** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.027) 
South 0.024 0.003 0.001 0.024 0.004 0.044 
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029) (0.025) (0.031) 
Central 0.041 -0.021 -0.042 0.033 0.016 0.032 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) 
North -0.085** -0.013 0.000 -0.025 0.004 0.073** 
 (0.032) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) 
East 0.088* -0.075 -0.069 0.059 0.031 0.080 
 (0.044) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042) (0.035) (0.043) 
Constant 0.400 -0.546** -0.698** 0.566** -0.438** -0.440** 
  (0.204) (0.157) (0.144) (0.165) (0.147) (0.155) 
Number of Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 
R-squared 0.549 0.912 0.845 0.483 0.889 0.885 















Table E1. OLS estimates for girls’ middle school enrollment (1970, 1990, 2000) 
 Gini Kurdish Conflict Gini + 1 Gini + 2 Gini + 3 Gini + 4 Table 2, C2 
Gini coef. for land distr. -0.156   -0.122 -0.260* -0.289* -0.286* -0.270* 
 (0.130)   (0.123) (0.120) (0.111) (0.109) (0.122) 
Log of Kurdish %  -0.022      0.006 
  (0.016)      (0.011) 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years   -0.059**     -0.033 
   (0.017)     (0.017) 
Boys-to-girls ratio dummy    -0.091** -0.087** -0.063** -0.062** -0.054* 
    (0.027) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
Urban     0.332** 0.110 0.120 0.170* 
     (0.074) (0.078) (0.088) (0.085) 
Log of gdp pc      0.141** 0.142** 0.117** 
      (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) 
Log of pop. density       -0.004 -0.009 
       (0.016) (0.016) 
1990 dv 0.212** 0.220** 0.235** 0.205** 0.146** 0.094** 0.093** 0.113** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) 
2000 dv 0.697** 0.709** 0.741** 0.699** 0.613** 0.551** 0.550** 0.581** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) 
South -0.051 -0.054* -0.056** -0.043 -0.035 0.011 0.010 0.000 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Central -0.068* -0.064 -0.072* -0.061 -0.052* 0.006 0.004 -0.012 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
North -0.105** -0.107** -0.100** -0.102** -0.063** -0.013 -0.012 -0.019 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
East -0.225** -0.193** -0.175** -0.207** -0.173** -0.047 -0.049 -0.053 
 (0.032) (0.045) (0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) 
Constant 0.257** 0.209** 0.218** 0.243** 0.194** -0.668** -0.662** -0.484** 
  (0.065) (0.031) (0.020) (0.062) (0.059) (0.126) (0.129) (0.138) 
Number of Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 
R-squared 0.894 0.894 0.908 0.901 0.913 0.931 0.931 0.934 








Table E2: OLS estimates for number of teachers per 100 school-age children (all levels; 1980, 2000, 2012) 
 Kurdish Gini Conflict Kurdish + 1 Kurdish + 2 Kurdish + 3 Kurdish + 4 Table 4, C1 
Log of Kurdish % t-1 -0.757**   -0.437** -0.397** -0.381** -0.392** -0.399** 
 (0.124)   (0.093) (0.093) (0.081) (0.083) (0.087) 
Gini coef. for land distr. t-1  -3.322**      0.247 
  (0.961)      (0.440) 
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years   -0.098     -0.008 
   (0.172)     (0.061) 
5-14 pop. gr. previous 10 years    -0.253** -0.287** -0.232** -0.233** -0.236** 
    (0.030) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Log of gdp pc t-1     0.428** 0.610** 0.559** 0.554** 
     (0.110) (0.105) (0.106) (0.108) 
Log of pop. density t-1      -0.386** -0.422** -0.423** 
      (0.088) (0.102) (0.099) 
Urban t-1       0.458 0.444 
       (0.462) (0.459) 
2000 dv 2.013** 1.813** 1.992** 1.423** 1.068** 1.217** 1.187** 1.201** 
 (0.061) (0.080) (0.130) (0.120) (0.124) (0.111) (0.125) (0.143) 
2012 dv 3.330** 3.003** 3.191** 2.479** 2.022** 2.222** 2.172** 2.187** 
 (0.081) (0.094) (0.087) (0.121) (0.136) (0.139) (0.153) (0.159) 
South 0.109 0.050 -0.194 0.066 0.196 0.154 0.132 0.116 
 (0.253) (0.319) (0.339) (0.207) (0.210) (0.173) (0.170) (0.175) 
Central 0.221 0.005 -0.094 -0.072 0.084 -0.036 -0.067 -0.077 
 (0.181) (0.159) (0.171) (0.131) (0.128) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) 
North -0.108 0.017 0.117 -0.469** -0.277* -0.165 -0.147 -0.151 
 (0.146) (0.170) (0.162) (0.127) (0.130) (0.118) (0.120) (0.121) 
East 0.571 -0.750** -0.972** -0.058 0.302 0.166 0.143 0.135 
 (0.359) (0.262) (0.222) (0.244) (0.288) (0.239) (0.243) (0.247) 
Constant 3.926** 4.510** 2.886** 3.244** 0.962 1.198 1.547* 1.486 
  (0.202) (0.505) (0.181) (0.097) (0.756) (0.724) (0.757) (0.750) 
Number of Observations 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.817 0.780 0.760 0.873 0.882 0.900 0.901 0.901 






Table F1. Correlation Matrix  
 Gini Kurdish Fatalities 
Boys-to-





Gini coef. for land distr. 1        
Log of Kurdish % 0.600 1       
Log of fatalities prev. 10 years 0.211 0.525 1      
Boys-to-girls ratio dummy 0.212 0.292 0.285 1     
Urbanization rate 0.074 0.093 0.180 0.000 1    
Log of gdp pc -0.279 -0.400 -0.224 -0.207 0.650 1   
Log of pop. density -0.073 -0.232 -0.135 -0.039 0.530 0.547 1  
5-14 pop. gr. previous 10 years 0.511 0.321 -0.122 0.133 -0.110 -0.270 0.119 1 
Note: Column titles are abbreviated for presentation purposes.  
 
